Introduction
In 3], we present a new algorithm for computing an upper bound on the maximum average linear hull probability (MALHP) for the SPN symmetric cipher structure, a value required to make claims about provable security against linear cryptanalysis. This algorithm improves on existing work in that the resulting upper bound is a function of the number of encryption rounds (other upper bounds known to the authors are not), and moreover, it can be computed for an SPN with any linear transformation layer (the best previous result, that of Hong et. al 4] , applies only to SPNs with highly di usive linear transformations).
It is well known that there exists a duality between linear cryptanalysis and di erential cryptanalysis which allows certain results related to one of the attacks to be translated into the corresponding results for the other attack 1, 5] . Since this duality applies to our work in 3], we immediately obtain an algorithm for upper bounding the maximum average di erential probability (MADP) for SPNs (required to make claims about provable security against di erential cryptanalysis).
Note: In what follows, we assume familiarity with the notation and results of 3].
Dual Result
The algorithm of 3] is found in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. To obtain the dual algorithm, two changes are required. The rst is to replace the The second change is to replace the value q (de ned in (4) of 3]), which is the maximum linear probability over all SPN s-boxes, with the value p, the maximum di erential probability over all SPN s-boxes, de ned as follows: Let S be a bijective n n s-box, let x; y 2 f0; 1g n , and let 
